| Case No. |
Lower Court Judgments |
Hearing Date |
Judgment Date | Majority Author |
Vote |
| CCT 93/12 |
South Gauteng High Court, 9 Jun. 2011 SCA, 7 Sep. 2012 |
26 Feb. 2013 |
13 Jun. 2013 | Van der Westhuizen J. | 6-3 |
| Case No. |
Lower Court Judgments |
Hearing Date |
Judgment Date | Majority Author |
Vote |
| CCT84/12 |
North Gauteng High Court, 12 Apr. 2012 |
21 Feb. 2013 |
13 Jun. 2013 | The Court | Unanimous |
| Case No. |
Lower Court Judgments |
Hearing Date |
Judgment Date | Majority Author |
Vote |
| CCT 105/12 |
KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 4 May 2011 SCA, 1 Oct. 2012 |
7 Mar. 2013 |
12 Jun. 2013 | Jafta J. | 7-3 |
Mpofu v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others
| Case No. |
Lower Court Judgments |
Hearing Date |
Judgment Date | Majority Author |
Vote |
| CCT 124/11 |
WLD (now South Gauteng High Court), 4 May 2001 |
29 Nov. 2012 |
6 Jun. 2013 | Skweyiya J. | 8-3 |
Mr Mandla Mpofu was convicted of murder, kidnapping, assault, robbery with aggravating circumstances and unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition, and was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. At the time he committed the crimes, Mr Mpofu claimed he was sixteen years old, and he has appealed his sentence on the basis that the High Court did not adequately take into account the rights of children in section 28 of the Constitution, and specifically that "every child has the right not to be detained except as a measure of last resort….[and] the child may be detained only for the shortest appropriate period of time".
The Majority of the Constitutional Court, in a judgment written by Justice Skweyiya and concurred in by Chief Justice Mogoeng, Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke and Justices Cameron, Froneman, Jafta, Zondo and Yacoob dismissed Mr Mpofu's application for leave for appeal and application on the basis he had not shown he was under 18 at the time the offence was committed, and so section 28 would not relevant. In addition, the application for leave was made more than 10 year s after Mr Mpofu's sentence, and despite two additional applications for leave to appeal that did not raise the issue of his age, was not adequately explained.
Justice Van der Westhuizen wrote a dissenting judgment finding that on the wording of the High Court judgment, Mr Mpofu was a child at the time of the offence, and the High Court had failed to take this into account during sentencing. Justice Van der Westhuizen would have set aside the sentence and replaced it with one of 20 years imprisonment. Justices Nkabinde and Khampepe concurred in this judgment.
Liebenberg NO and Others v Bergrivier Municipality
| Case No. |
Lower Court Judgments |
Hearing Date |
Judgment Date | Majority Author |
Vote |
| CCT 104/12 |
Western Cape High Court, 25 Aug. 2011 SCA, 1 Oct. 2012 |
12 Mar. 2013 |
6 Jun. 2013 | Mhlantla AJ. | 7-2 |
Prior to the adoption of the interim Constitution in 1993, rural landowners did not have to pay rates to municipalities. In 1993 the Local Government: Transition Act 209 of 1993 ("Transition Act") was enacted to provide uniformity in local government throughout South Africa, and that every part of a province should fall within the jurisdiction of a local council. Between 2001 and 2009, various farm owners within the Bergrivier Municipality refused to pay municipal rates. Various specific issues were raised regarding different rates imposed in different years during that period, but in essence the Constitutional Court will have to determine whether the Municipality was empowered to impose the rates at the relevant time, and if so whether the Municipality did so within its powers.
In a judgment written by Acting Justice Mhlantla, the majority of the Constitutional Court (including Chief Justice Mogoeng, Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke and Justices Froneman, Nkabinde, Skweyiya and Zondo) found that section 10G(7) of the Transition Act empowered the Bergrivier Municipality to impose the rates for the 2006/2007 and 2008/2009 financial years. In addition the majority found that the Municipality had substantially complied with the relevant statutory provisions in respect of the rates imposed between 2001 to 2005.| Case No. |
Lower Court Judgments |
Hearing Date |
Judgment Date | Majority Author |
Vote |
| CCT 57/12 |
North Gauteng High Court, 24 Mar. 2010 SCA, 1 Jun. 2012 |
20 Nov. 2012 |
30 May 2013 | Froneman J, Khampepe J and Skweyiya J. | Unanimous |
The primary issue is that the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act ("the Act") in section 7(6) requires that, if a man married under customary law wishes to enter into a further customary marriage, he must apply to court to approve a written contract that will regulate the future matrimonial property system of the marriages.
Mr Ngwenyama did not make such an application in respect of his 2008 marriage, and the question the Constitutional Court must address is whether this renders the second marriage null and void.
A secondary issue that was not fully dealt with in the SCA or High Court was whether under Xitsonga customary law the first wife's consent was required before the husband could enter a second marriage. If this is such a requirement, and as Ms Mayelane did not give her consent, this would also render the 2008 marriage void.On the first issue, the Constitutional Court found, in a judgment written jointly by Justices Froneman, Khampepe and Skweyiya and concurred in by the Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke and Justices Cameron and Yacoob, that the the Act did not prescribe requirements for the validity of a customary marriage, and this was left to customary law itself.
The Constitutional Court, after calling for further evidence on the content of Xitsonga customary law, found, in the main judgment, that Xitsonga customary law, at the time of the purported second marriage Xitsonga customary law required the first wife to be informed of the subsequent marriage (not necessarily consent). They then held that as Ms Mayelane had not been informed the second marriage was invalid. The Court then went on to find that the Constitution required Customary law to developed so that it is consistent with the Constitution, and therefore found that to the extent Xitsonga customary law did not require the first wife's consent for the husband to enter a subsequent marriage, the law should be developed to include such a requirement.
In a separate judgment, Justice Zondo agreed in the result, but considered there to be sufficient evidence that Xitsonga custom required the first wife's consent for subsequent marriages.
Justice Jafta also wrote a separate judgment with whom Chief Justice Mogoeng and Justice Nkabinde concurred, in which he also considered there to be sufficient evidence that Xitsonga custom required the first wife's consent for the validity of the subsequent marriages, but also that court's should only develop customary law of their own accord in exceptional circumstances.
Download the judgment here.
Read our full summary here.

Minister of Police and Others v Premier of the Western Cape and Others
|
Case No. |
Lower Court Judgments |
Hearing Date |
|
CCT 13/13 |
Western Cape High Court, 13 Jan. 2013 |
6 Aug. 2013 |
The case involves the legality of the Premier of the Western Cape’s (“the Premier’s”) appointment of the O’Regan Commission into complaints related to inefficiency in the South African Police Service ("the SAPS") stations in Khayelitsha, as well as the breakdown in relations between the SAPS operating in Khayelitsha and the Khayelitsha community (“the O’Regan Commission”).
On 24 August 2012, the Premier established the O’Regan Commission, appointing its chair, former Justice of the Constitutional Court, Catherine O’Regan, and Mr. Vusumuzi Pikoli as commissioners.
On 5 November 2012, the applicants, including the Minister of Police (“the Minister”), the National Commissioner of the SAPS (“the National Commissioner”) and the Western Cape Provincial Commissioner of the SAPS (“the Provincial Commissioner”) launched an application in two parts: first, seeking an interim interdict halting the operation of the O’Regan Commission, and specifically to prevent Commission from giving effect to subpoenas it had issued or to issue further subpoenas, pending the outcome of the second part; and second, seeking an order setting aside the establishment of the O’Regan Commission.
In brief, the High Court found the O'Regan Commission to have been lawfully established, and dismissed the application.
The Constitutional Court will decide whether the High Court was correct in dismissing the application to halt the conduct of the O’Regan Commission pending the outcome of the main application to set it aside. The proceedings in the Constitutional Court are thus likely to focus on whether the requirements for an interim interdict were met. Of course, even if the Constitutional Court agrees with the High Court and refuses to grant the interim relief, the main application, that is the second part of the application to actually set aside the Commission will still go ahead in the High Court.
An additional question the Constitutional Court might consider, which was not raised in the High Court, is whether this matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court (and thus should not have been instituted in the High Court). Section 167(4)(a) states that "only the Constitutional Court may decide disputes between organs of state in the national or provincial sphere concerning the constitutional status, powers and functions of any of those organs of state".
Read our full summary here.
Khumalo and Another v MEC for Education, Kwazulu-Natal
|
Case No. |
Lower Court Judgments |
Hearing Date |
|
CCT 10/13 |
Labour Court, Durban, 6 Jul. 2010 Labour Appeal Court, 29 Aug. 2012 |
8 Aug. 2013 |
The case involves whether the promotions of two persons within the Kwazulu-Natal Department of Education (“the Department”) should be set aside as unlawful.
Mr. Khumalo, the first appellant, applied for and was promoted to the position of Chief Personnel Officer in the Department in April 2004. Mr. Ritchie, the second appellant in this matter, had also applied for the post but was not shortlisted. He challenged the failure to shortlist him before the General Public Servants Sectoral Bargaining Council on the basis he should have been shortlisted as he met all the requirements for the post. As a result of this process, Mr. Ritchie and the Department entered into a settlement agreement whereby Mr. Ritchie was granted a protected promotion to the post to which Mr. Khumalo had already been promoted, and Mr. Khumalo was allowed to retain his promotion.
In late 2005, the National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers lodged a complaint with the MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal (“MEC”) alleging that both Mr. Khumalo and Mr. Ritchie’s appointments where unlawful. The basis for the complaint was that Mr. Khumalo did not meet the minimum requirements for the post that required a minimum of two years’ experience in a salary level 6 or 7 position, as Mr. Khumalo was level 5 at the time of his promotion. The complaint regarding Mr. Ritchie was that the he could not be appointed to the post as he had not been shortlisted for it, and therefore the Department did not have the power to enter a settlement agreement appointing him to the post. A task team was set up to investigate the appointments, and reported in January 2006, effectively upholding the complaint.
The MEC accepted the task team’s findings and approached the Labour Court, albeit only in October 2008, to have both Mr. Khumalo’s and Mr. Ritchie’s promotions overturned. The Labour Court found that both promotions were unlawful and unreasonable, and set them aside. Although the Labour Appeal Court Found that the Labour Court had made some factual errors, mainly related to the MEC’s conduct, it was not of the view that the findings which resulted from these factual errors related to the main issue for determination. The Labout Appeal Court opined that the setting aside of the appointments would incline more towards the promotion of the principle of legality, and the appointments were accordingly set aside.
The Constitutional Court will have to decide whether the Labour Appeal Court correctly decided these issues.For more overviews of upcoming cases go to the upcoming hearings page.
|
Case No. |
Lower Court Judgments |
Hearing Date |
|
CCT 12/2013 |
North Gauteng High Court, 4 Jan. 2013
|
30 May 2013 |
This case comes before the Constitutional Court by way of confirmation proceedings in terms of section 172(2) of the Constitution, following the North Gauteng High Court (“NGHC”) per Rabie J having declared sections of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (“the Act”) to be unconstitutional.
In the NGHC, the applicants challenged the constitutional validity of sections 15 (“Acts of consensual sexual penetration with certain children (statutory rape)”), 16 (“Acts of consensual sexual violation with certain children (statutory sexual assault)”) and 56(2) (dealing with defences in respect of sections 15 and 16 of the Act) (collectively, “the impugned provisions”). The impugned provisions criminalise a wide range of consensual sexual activities involving children aged between 12 and 15 years, including all forms of kissing on the mouth. The applicants did not challenge the impugned provisions insofar as they relate to the sexual conduct of adults; however, to the extent that the impugned provisions criminalise the sexual conduct of children, the applicants argued that they are unconstitutional. This affects the consensual sexual activity of a child aged between 16 and 18 years with a child aged between 12 and 15 years, as well as the consensual sexual activity of two children aged between 12 and 15 years.
Read our full summary here.
Brittania Beach Estate (Pty) Ltd and others v Saldanha Bay Municipality
|
Case No. |
Lower Court Judgments |
Hearing Date |
|
CCT 11/13 |
Western Cape High Court, 6 Jun. 2011 |
28 May. 2013 |
The case involves a challenge brought by a property developer ("Brittania") against a tariff used to determine bulk infrastructure development levies by the Saldanha Bay Municipality ("the Municipality"). The Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (“LUPO”) allows a municipality in section 42 to impose conditions on the grant of applications for rezoning and sub-division of land (in terms of sections 16 and 25 of LUPO. The tariff for the calculation of capital contributions is set by council resolution. In June 2007 the tariff was changed and the new tariff later revoked. During the period after the new tariff came into force and prior its revocation of the new tariff the Municipality had imposed conditions on rezoning approvals granted to Brittania that included the payment of capital contributions calculated under the new tariff.
Brittania challenged those conditions arguing the revocation of the tariff rendered conditions imposed invalid. The High Court found for Brittania, but the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the rezoning approvals and the conditions imposed were properly imposed, and had force separate from the council resolutions that set the tariff, and were therefore valid. Brittania has appeal this decision to the Constitutional Court.
Read our full summary here.
Grootboom v National Prosecuting Authority and Another
|
Case No. |
Lower Court Judgments |
Hearing Date |
|
CCT 08/13 |
Labour Court, 18 Dec. 2009
Labour Appeal Court, 21 Sep. 2012
|
23 May 2013 |
This matter stems from a decision by the NPA to invoke section 17(5)(a)(i) of the Public Service Act 103 of 1994 ("the Act") to discharge the employment services of Mr Grootboom. In the Constitutional Court, Mr Grootboom seeks an order for that decision to be set aside.
Read our full summary here.
Coetzee v National Commissioner of Police and Others
|
Case No. |
Lower Court Judgments |
Hearing Date |
|
CCT 124/12 |
North Gauteng High Court, 11 Oct. 2012 Supreme Court of Appeal, 16 Nov. 2012 |
21 May 2013 |
The case involves a challenge to the requirements for a lawful arrest, in circumstances where the appellant, Mr Coetzee, was flagged down by a metro police officer and refused to stop, on the basis, according to Mr Cotzee, that he would drive to the nearest police station. The case also considers whether the North Gauteng High Court was correct in ordering that Mr Coetzee be released from custody on the basis of his unlawful detention.
Read our full summary here.
M&G Media Limited and Others v Chipu NO and Others
|
Case No. |
Lower Court Judgments |
Hearing Date |
|
CCT 136/12 |
North Gauteng High Court, 9 Dec 2012
|
14 May 2013 |
In this matter, members of the media have called on the Constitutional Court to determine the constitutionality of section 21(5) of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998. The provision states that ‘the confidentiality of asylum applications and the information contained therein must be ensured at all times’. The media argue that the provision is unconstitutional in so far as it entails a blanket ban on media access to Refugee Appeal Board (RAB) hearings. They argue that the RAB must be vested with a discretion on whether, and on what conditions, to allow media access to an asylum hearing. The state, on the other hand, argues that a blanket ban is necessary to ensure the safety of asylum applicants as well as their family and witnesses.
Read our full summary here.
Disclosure: Webber Wentzel is representing the appellants in this matter. Duncan Wild, Greg Palmer and Ben Winks have been involved in the instruction.
The Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary School v MEC for Education, Gauteng Province
|
Case No. |
Lower Court Judgments |
Hearing Date |
|
CCT 135/12 |
South Gauteng High Court, 7 Dec. 2011 Supreme Court of Appeal, 30 Nov. 2012 |
9 May 2013 |
The case concerns whether it is the Provincial Department of Education or the governing body of a public school that has the power to determine the number of learners that the school may admit, and whether the Provincial Department of Education may override any determination in this respect by a governing body.
Read our full summary here.
Mukaddam and Others v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd and Others
|
Case No. |
Lower Court Judgments |
Hearing Date |
|
CCT 115/12 |
Western Cape High Court, 7 April 2011 SCA, 29 Nov. 2012 |
7 May 2013 |
The issue is whether the applicants can receive certification from the court in order to bring a class action against the respondents. Two components are before the Constitutional Court: whether the applicants have shown a legally tenable cause of action; and whether there is any alternative method through which the applicants could bring their claim.
Read our full summary here.
Mansingh and Others v General Council of the Bar and Another
Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another
MHLANTLA, NONKOSI ZOLISWA.
Personal:
2 May 1964, Port Elizabeth
One child
Education:
Matric: Kenneth Masekela High School, Kwa-Thema, Springs
B Proc (1987) University of the North, Limpopo
Professional History
Attorney, N Mhlantla & Associates: 1990 – 31 May 2002
Acting Judge, Eastern Cape High Court: April 2000 – 30 September 2000
Judge of the High Court, Eastern Cape: 1 June 2002 – 30 November 2008
Acting Judge, Supreme Court of Appeal: 1 June – 30 November 2008
Judge of Appeal, Supreme Court of Appeal: 2009
BOSIELO, LEBOTSANG ORPHAN.
Personal:
19 August 1957
Wife: Shirley
Two children
Education:
Matric: Lerothodi High School, Bethanie
B Juris (1981) University of Limpopo, Polokwane
LLB (1983) University of Limpopo, Polokwane
LLM (1992) University of Johannesburg
Diploma in Advanced Corporate Law (1996) University of Johannesburg
Professional History:
Candidate Attorney, Enver Surty Attorneys, Zinniaville: 1984 – 1986
Admitted as an Attorney: 1986
Partner at Bosielo, Motlanthe & Lekabe: 1987 – 1992
Senior Partner, Ronnie Bosielo Attorneys: 1992 – 1998
Admitted as an Advocate: 1998
Practising Advocate: 1999 – 2001
Judge of the High Court of South Africa, North Gauteng High Court: 2001 – 2009
Acting Judge of the High Court, Namibia: 2001
Acting Judge President, Northern Cape High Court: 2007 – 2008
Acting Judge, Supreme Court of Appeal: 2009
Judge of Appeal, Supreme Court of Appeal: 2009
